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SITUATION

II

. ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURES AND MARITIME
JURISDICTION
States X and Y are at 'var. Other states are neutral.
(a) A merchant vessel of state N, the Nagle, is anchorecl in the lee of and 1,000 feet fron1 a lighthouse of
stateR. The lighthouse is 14 n1iles off the coast of state
Rand is built upon a reef always submerged. A cruiser
of state X, the Xanthos, approaches and is about to visit
and search the LVagle, when vessels of war of states N
and R. appear and the Nagle calls upon both for protection.
(b) State R has also established a landing station for
aircraft built upon a submerged reef 20 miles fro In any
land.
ould the sa1ne solution as for (a) hold in case
the LVagle 'vas anchored off this station.
(c) State R has also established a floating landing
station for aircraft anchored to a submerged reef 20
1niles from any land.
ould the same solution as for
(a) hold" in case the Nagle w·as tied to the floating landing station?
(d) StateR has filled in a strip of shallow water out
:from its coast a distance of 5 miles, thus making a narrow causeway to a landing station for aircraft. The
station is built upon a reef 'vhich is always submergec.
Would the same solution as for (a) hold in case the
Nagle was sailing within 1 1nile of the causeway but
4lh miles from the mainland of R ~
(e) Ho\v should an aircraft of Y be treated by: ( 1)
a cruiser of X, and (2) by a military aircraft of X
when not more than 3 miles from the landing station
mention€cl in (b), the floating landing station mentioned in (c) and the cause"ray mentioned in (d) 1
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SOLUTION

(a) The visit and search o£ the neutral merchant vessel is la w£ul, as there is no terri to rial sea around the
lighthouse built upon a subn1erged ree£ 14 miles £rom
any coast. No protection other than to assure the la \V£ul exercise o£ the visit and search should be given to
the Nagle.
(b) The visit and search o£ the neutral merchant vessel is la w£ul, as there is no terri to rial sea around the
landing station £or aircraft built upon a submerged ree£
20 miles £rom any land. No protection other than to
assure the law£ul exercise o£ the visit and search should
be given by neutral vessels o£ war to the Nagle.
(c) The visit and search o£ the Nagle tied to an anchored landing station £or aircraft o£ R is law£ul, as
there is no territorial sea around the landing station £or
aircraft 20 miles £rom any land. No protection other·
than to assure the law£ul exercise o£ the visit and search
should be given to the Nagle.
(d) 1~he visit and search o£ the neutral merchant vessel w·ithin 1 mile o£ a causeway built out £rom shore to
a landing station £or aircraft is not law£ul, as the merchant vessel is within territorial sea and the vessel of
,\.,ar o£ R should afford protection against any. violation
of the neutrality o£ state R, and should protect the merchant vessel against any Yiolation o£ its rights within
these waters.
(e) All enemy aircraft are liable to capture i£ non-military, or to attack i£ military, when not on or over
the landing station mentioned in (b) or (c). Enemy
aircraft may not be lawfully captured or attacked when
\vithin 3 miles of the causeway or landing station mentioned in (d) but should be interned.
NOTES

High sea:s.-The rights of states and o£ persons in regard to the high seas has been a matter o£ differing
opinion and practice from early times. This is under--
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standable 'vhen the nature of the sea and its varied
uses are considered. When the sea is regarded as the
barrier against invasion, the attitude 'vould be different
fro1n that at a time when the sea is regarded as a high'\vay· bet,veen countries. There would also be the differ .
ences due to interest in the seas as a source of food supply
and as the 'vay of com1nerce. The theories and contentions of Grotius in Mare Liberum, 1608, made clear the
demand for freedom of the sea 'vhich Selden in Mare
Clausu1n, 1635, tried to meet by somewhat exaggerated~
though ably presented, pretentious of England for n
closed sea.
A survey of the Inaterial .relating to the control and
use of the sea sho,vs the influence of national interests
upon the views sustained which range from that of exclusive proprietary rights to the denial of any control.
The clai1n to exclusive property in the sea 'vas gradually
abandoned, but other interests remained which could not
be abandoned. It had been found that many pretensions
nnd paper claims embodied in proc1amations and decrees
Y\-"'ere not worth maintaining. There was, therefore,
growing willingness to accept Bynk.ershoek's proposal of
1702 that the authority of the state over the sea should
extend to the effective range of the cannon, which at that
time 'vas esti1nated to be 3 1niles. The 3-mile lin1it be<'HJne In ore and In ore conventionalized but was not uni-versally accepted even at the Hague Codification Con-ference in 1930.
Use of the sea.-vVhile there are differing theories as
~o the nature of 1nariti1ne rights, there is a general agreeJnent that innocent use o£ the sea is common to all.
\Vhat the li1nits of innocent use are is debatable and has
~:roused controversies. Some of the controversies have
-1>een settled by the course o£ events without any for1nal
~J.bandonment of positions assun1ed by any party; others
ltave resu1 ~d . 1 treaty a(rrt> Ll~ll f'll
J 1 nderstandings.
In general, it may be said that use, as
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i n navigation, is accepted as a right of all; and abuses,

as by pollution, is denied as generally injurious.
In concrete instances, such as the laying of submarine
cables, there is an admitted innocent use which may be
supported against negligent use such as careless dragging of an anchor upon the sea bottom in a submarine
cable area, or there may be an admitted abuse such as
in the case of piracy, or a conventional abuse as in slave
trade.
The problem of use anu abuse in time of war differs
ntaterially from the same problem in time of peace, and
belligerent use differs from neutral use. The limits of
territorial jurisdiction are not changed by virtue of use
or abuse of the sea in time of peace or in time of war
though the rights of use may be modified.
Aids to navigation.-While islands as products of natural forces are generally appropriated, artificial structures have a status differing somewhat according to circumstances.
The free use of the sea by all under ordinary conditions is now admitted. Ships may sail at will on the
high sea. That they may sail safely, it is essential that
dangerous places be marked. That the voyage 1nay be
convenient and profitable, it is essential that routes be
buoyed and lighted and that depths be known. For such
purposes national agencies have been permitted to assun1e
a degree of jurisdiction outside their maritime limits.
States have built and maintained lighthouses on reefs
well beyond their maritime jurisdiction and have marked
channels in the high seas. They serve the general good
but may specially benefit the state which has undertaken
their construction and maintenance. It may be true that
the locating in the high seas of some aid to navigation
may modify the path of commerce and benefit one state
at the cost. of another, but if it is for the general good,
the action of the state benefited will often be approved
as setting an example to other states.
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Gene1"a.l considera.tions.-All states have a common
right to use the high seas for navigation and to a share
in its resources. Long and unopposed appropriation of
the products of the sea by a state in a certain area may
lead other states to acquiesce in the claim of exclusive
use, or treaties bet,veen states may voluntarily regulate
the use of the high sea or its resources so far as the
states parties to the treaties are concerned.
Extension of authority beyond the territorial sea has
been tolerated in certain cases as a measure of protection
in such instances as in the establishing of defense areas
adjacent to fortifications or for strategic reasons. The
placing of lighthouses, buoys, etc., 'vhich serve all alike
has beco1ne customary and the state which has constructed and placed thelighthouse or buoy has admittedly
the jurisdiction over it, but it is now generally maintained that the jurisdiction of the state does not extend
beyond the lighthouse itself into the surrounding high
sea. Perhaps it might be affir1ned that artificial structures built in the high seas do not extend the area of
the terri to rial sea of the state placing the structure,
while structures built out fron1 the land 1nay extend the
coast line and correspondingly extend the territorial sea
Ineasured from that line. Areas appearing above. the
surface of the sea from natural causes have been regarded as belonging to the nearby state as in the case
of the Anna, 1805 ( 5 C. Robinson 373), when the British
Court held that mud islands formed at the mouth of the
Mississippi River were American territory and that
jurisdiction extended 3 miles from these islands. Islands
discovered in the high seas at a distance from .land belong to the discoverer if they are subsequently occupied
or if steps are taken for effective occupation.
Suggestions as to jurisdiction.-V arious suggestions
have been made from time to time as to jurisdiction over
"airports in the high seas", "floating islands", "marine
bases for aircraft ", " sea bases for aircraft ", " sea-
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dromes ", or over such contrivances under some other
title. In 1925 the American Institute of International
Law put forth what is called a project in regard to
jurisdiction, of which articles 13 and 14 were as follows:
.ARTICLE

13.

The American Republics whose coasts are washed by the waters
of the sea and which possess a navy or 1nercantile marine, shall
haYe the right to occupy an extent of the high sea contiguous
to their respective territorial sea necessary for the establishment
of the following more or less permanent installations, provided
they are in the general interest:
1. Bases for nonmilitary airships and dirigibles ;
2. \Vireless telegraph stations;
3. Stations for submarine cables;
4. Lighthouses ;
5. Stations for scientific exploration;
6. Refuge stations for the shipwrecked.
ARTICLE

14

It is expressly forbidden to fortify the installations referred
to in the preceding article and to use them, even indirectly, ns
bases of supply for warships, military airplanes and dirigibles,
or for submarines. (20 American Journal International Law,
Sve·cial Supplement, 19'26,. tJ. 325.)

'fhis subject had been 1nentioned in Professor Schiicking's report to the League of Nations Committee on
Territorial Waters. He said:
As regards islands which are artificially created by anchorage
to the bed of the sea, and which have no solid connection with
the bed of the sea, but which are employed for the establi~hment
of a firm foundation, e.g., for enterprises designed to facilitate
aerial navigation, we must be guided by the vie'v that such an
enterprfse cannot claim that a special zone of territorial sea is
constituted round such artificial island. Such fictitious islands
must lJe assimilated to vessels voyaging on the high seas.
It has been discussed whether a zone of territorial sea should
be established around artificial islands which are actually connected with the bottom, such as islands designed to carry lighthouses ; there is no uniform legal doctrine as regards such island~.
This i~ evident fron1 the fact that two such e1ninent authorit-ies
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as the English judge, Lord Russell, and the~ jurist, 1\1. L. Oppenheim, have expressed divergent views.
Lord Russell states: " If a lighthouse is built upon a rock or
upon piles driven into the sea, it becomes, as far as that lighthouse is concerned, part of the territory of the nation which llns
erected it." Oppenheiln says : " Il n'y pas de droHs de· souverainete sur une zone de la mer que baigne les ph ares." (Ibid.,
p. 87.)

After discussion no mention of this subject appeared
in the amended draft.
The circulation of aircraft in relation to the high sea
'Yas a particular subject of discussion at the Neuvieme
Congres International de Legislation Aerienne in 1930.
After several days of discussion, the follo,ving text was
adopted:
AEROPORTS

DE

HA UT'EI l\1EIR

ARTIC'LE PR.EMIER,.-Aucun aeroport de haute mer, cree pour les
hesoins de la navigation aerienne, qu'il soit la propriete d'un
particulier ou d'un Etat, ne peut etre etabli en haute mer autrement que sous l'autorite et la responsabilite d'un Etat, que ce
dernier ait nn littoral maritime on non.
ART. 2.-L~Etat sous l'autorite duquel se trouve place cet aeroport de haute mer en regie les conditions d'acces et d'exploitation.
Si l'aeroport de haute 1ner est ouvert a l'usage public, aucune
discrimination ne peut etre faite, au point de vue de l'acces, sur
la base de la nationalite.
ART. 3.-Les Etats doivent porter reciproquement a leur connaissance leurs projects de creation d'aeroports de haute rner.
Au cas ofl dans un delai a determiner quelque Etat s'y opposait
le differend serait porte devant la Societe des Nations et tranche
par elle.
Si pour une raison quelconque la Societe des Nations ne pouYait etre· utile·menLsaisie-ou si elle ne parvenait pas a regler le
oifferend-les parties seront tenues de re·courir a la procedure de
!'arbitrage obligatoire. (9 Congr·e s International de Legislation
Aerienne, p. 233.)

,.

While certain propositions in regard to the treatment
of seadromes in time of war had been before the Congress, no conclusions ·were agreed to as a result of the
deliberations.
3628-34--5
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R esolutions, Budapest, 1930.-At the ninth meeting of
the Co mite J uridique International de !'Aviation at
Budapest, October 1, 1930, certain resolutions 'vere also,
after discussion, adopted. These were as follows:
ARTIOLE PREMIER.-Aucun aeroport flottant, Cree pour les
besoins de la navigation aerienne, qu'il soit la propriete d'un particulier ou d'un Etat, ne peut etre etabli en haute mer, autrement que sous l'autorite et la responsabilite d'un Etat, que ce
dernier ait un littoral maritime ou non.
ART. 2.-L'Etat sous l'autorite duquel se trouve place cet
aeroport flottant en regle les conditions d'acces et d'exploitation.
Si l'aeroport flottant est ouvert a l'usage public, aucune discrimination ne peut etre faite, au point de vue de l'acceS', sur la
base de la nationalite.
ART. 3.-Les: Etats. doivent porter reciproquement a leur connaissance leurs projets de creation d'aeroports flottants.
Au cas ou dans un delai a determiner quelque Etat s'y opposerait, le differend serait porte devant la Societe des Nations
et tranche par eUe.
Si, pour une raison quelconque, la Societe des Nations ne
pouvait etre utilement saisie-ou si elle ne parvenait pas a
regler le differend-les parties seront tenues de recourir a la
procedure de !'arbitrage obligatoire.
ART. 4.-En temps de guerre, un aeroport de haute mer ne peut
etre l'objet ni de capture, ni de deroutement. Toutefois, quand
l'aeroport releve de l'un des belligerants, !'autre peut le faire
passer sous son autorite.
En aucun cas il n'est permis a l'un des belligerants de convertir
un aeroport neutre en base aero-navale. Un tel usage engagerait,
conformement aux principes generaux de la neutralite, la responsabilite de l'Etat qui a autorite sur l'aeroport de haute mer.
(XV Droit Aerien, p. 24.)

Dis·qussion in the I nstitut de Droit International,
1913.-In 1913 the Institut de Droit International discussed the subject of maritime jurisdiction. Sir Thomas
Barclay and Prof. L. Oppenheim made the report, but
they were not in entire accord. In the report of Professor Oppenheim was also pointed out some questions
relating to jurisdiction over lighthouses:
Ayant discute les trois articles de l'avant-proje·t de Sir T.
Barclay sur lesquels je ne suis P<?int d'accord avec lui, je voudrais
maintenant attirer !'attention sur un point important qui n'est
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pas mentionne dans Je rapport de Sir T. Barclay, c'est-a-dire, la
question des phares batis sur des rochers ou des banes de mer.
C'est une regie fixe que la zone de la mer territoriale doit etre
mesuree a partir de la laisse de basse maree de la cote, que cette
cote soit celle de la terre ferme ou celle d'une ile situee dans
la zone de la mer territoriaJe de la terre ferme, ou la cote d'une
ile situee dans la haute mer et occupee par un Etat. La question se pose done de savoir si un phare bati sur un rocher ou sur
un bane de mer submerge, dans la haute mer ou dans la mer
territoriale, doit etre con·sidere comme si c'etait une ile, de sorte
que l'Etat possesseur du phare aurait un droit de souverainete
sur une mer territoriale a l'entour de ce phare.
Ce point est de haute importance, car beaucoup de phares sont
batis sur des rocher's ou sur des piles enfoncees dans le lit de la
mer en dehors de la mer territoriale. Par example, le fameux
phare d'Eddystone dans la l\1anche est a quatorze milles de la
cote du Devonshire. (26 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International p. 408.)

Professor Oppenheim then refers to the position of
Sir Charles Russell in the Bering Sea Arbitration 'vhich
is not entirely clear and saysSi cette assertion de Sir Charles Russell etait juste, il serait
necessaire d'accorder a tout Etat qui a bati un tel phare un
droit de souverainete sur la mer territoriale entourant ce phare;
mais, a mon sens, cette assertion n'est pas justifiee. J e crois
que !'assimilation des phares aux iles est de nature a induire en
erreur, et qu'il vaudrait mieux traiter les phares sur le meme
pied que les bateaux-phares amarres. De meme qu'un Etat n'a
pas le pouvoir de reclamer souverainete sur une mer territoriale a
l'entour d'un bateau-phare amarre, de meme il n'a pas le pouvoir
de reclamer cette souverainet~e ·sur une zone maritime a l'entour
d'un phare dans la mer.
Pour cette raison, je proposerais d'ajouter a l'article ler de
l'avant-projet l'alinea 3 qui suit: " II n'y a pa·s de droit de souverainet~e sur une zone de la mer qui baigne les phares."
(Ibid.,
p. 410.)

Acquisition of island jurisdiction.-Where an island is
discovered and occupied, it is commonly considered as
being under the jurisdiction of the state of the flag of
the discoverer and occupier if it is outside the maritime
limits of any other state. Even if an island should be
thrown up by volcanic or other force, the state of the
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discoverer 'vould have valid clain1 to jurisdiction. This
practice o£ appropriation by the discoverer and occupier
has long- been recognized.
lVhat is an island?-It is generally admitted that territorial sea 1nay be claimed around an island to be measured as £ro1n the mainland.
In the general observations submitted by governments
which beca1ne the bases o£ discussion £or the League o£
Nations Conference £or the Codification o£ International
La 'v, there \Vere replies to the question, what is meant
by an island in considering its relation to territorial
waters?
The reply o£ Great Britain, with 'vhich other states
o£ the British Cominon,vealth o£ N atjons generally
agreed, vvas as £ollo,vs :
An island is a piece of territory surrounded by ·water and in
normal circumstances permanently above high water. It does
not include a piece of territory not capable of effective occupation and use.
His l\1ajesty's Government consider that there is no groutHl
for clain1ing that a belt of territorial "\Vaters exists round rocks
and banks not constituting islands as defined above, and would
view with favour an international agreement to this effect in
order that there 1nay be no doubt as to the status of the waters
round such rocks and banks and round artificial structures raised
upon thetn. (Conference for the Codification of Int. Law. League
of Nations. C. 74 l\1. 39, 1929, V., vol. II, p. 53.)

This British view would .n ot merely deny territorial
waters £or artificial structures but also certain rocks and
banks.
The German reply gave a different point o£ vie'v:
The Gennan Govennnent considers that the geographical notion
of an "island", which is taken a~ the basis in the preparation
of maritime charts, covers all the characteristics of a natural
island J. any land which emerges from the sea ancl is dry at
the level adopted in the chart must therefore be reg-arded as a
natural island. -The claim occasionally advanced that anchored
buoys, and in particular lightships, snould be regarded as
" islands " wo\1Id seein to be indefensible. It should therefore
be laid down that artificial islands ·(artificial constructions)
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should be assimilated to natural islands, provided that they rest
on the sea bottom and have hu1nan inhabitants. (Ibid., p. 52.)

The Gern1an reply accordingly assimilates inhabited
artificial constructions resting on the sea botton1 to
natural islands.
De1unark introduces certain conditions as to the extension of j uriscliction by artificial structures.
In lletermiuing the extent of the territorial waters around the·
coast, account is also taken of islands and reefs, as has been
stated in paragraph IY (a). The same rule applies to artificial
islands, lig~1thouses, etc., when determining the breadth of the·
territorial b('lt towards the open sea.
Where the territorial waters of two states are in contact,
ucither of them would be entitleLl to nwllify the existing delhnitation to the prejudice of tlle other, by the construction of artifidal
i~lands, lighthouses, etc.
(Ibid., p. 52.)

'rhe Nether lands proposed the following :
an island should be understood to be any natural or artificial
elevation of the sea bott01n above the surface of the sea at lo\V
tide. (Ibid., p. 50.)

This point o£ view does not distinguish between natural
and artificial eleYations provided that they are exposed
at lo'v tide.
Rtunania went further in its inclusive categories,
saying,
by an island slwuld be understood a land surface, rocky or
otherwise, covered or not covered by water, connected or unconnected with the continent, over which it is impossible to navigate.
(Ibid., p. 53.)

The Conunittee in preparing the Basis £or Discussion,
in vie'v of the replies, 1nade no reference as to artificial
structures but forn1ulated the follo\ving:
In order that an island may have its own territorial waters,
it is necessary that it sllould be permanently above the level of
high tide.
In order that an island lying within the territorial waters of
another island or of the mainland 1nay be taken into account in
determining the belt of such territorial waters, it is sufficient for
tile island to be above water at low tide. (Ibid., p. 54.)
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'fhe result o:f the consideration by the Second Commission o:f the Conference of 1930 was:
Every island has its own territorial sea. An island is an area
of land, surrounded by water, which is permanently above highwater mark.
OBSERVATIONS.

The definition of the term " island " does not exclude artificial
islands, provided these are true portions of the territory and not
merely floating works, anchored buoys, etc. The case of an
artificial island erected near to the line of de1na rcation between
the territorial waters of two countries is reserYed. (League of
Nations Documents, C. 230. M. 117. 1930. V., p. 13.)

rfhis statement does not make clear ·what \VOUld be the
attitude upon artificial islands in general, but merely
makes somewhat indefinite re:ferences to islands, " true
portions o:f the territory."
Lighthouses, 189.3.-In the Argu1nent o:f the United
States in the Fur Seal Arbitration, 1893, a question was
incidentally raised in regard to lighthouses.
If a light-house were erected by a nation in waters outside of
the" three-mile line, for the benefit of its own commerce and that
of the \Yorld, if so1ne pursuit for gain on the adjacent high sea
should be discovered which would obscure the light or endanger
the light-house or the lives of its ilnnates, would that Government be defenseless? (9 Fur Seal Arbitration, Argument of the
United States, p. 176.)

Sir Charles Russell re:ferring to this and to questions
raised as he discussed the point in his oral argtunent said:
'Veil, it is a very difficult case to realize \vhat is really meant" by
that. For instance, I cannot quite realize how a pursuit of fishing on the high sea could, except by so1ne stretch of imagination
of which I am not capable, require the obscurity of the light of
a 1ight-house, or endanger the light-house or the lives of its inmat~s; but I wish to point out that I think my friend has, for
the mmnent forgotten, that if a light-house is built upon a rock
or upon· piles driven into the bed of the sea. it becmnes, as far
as that light-house is concerned, part of the territory of the
nation \Yhich has erected it, and, as part of the territory of the
nation which has erected it, it has, incident to it, all the rights
that belong to the protection of territory-no n1ore and no less.
1\fr. PHELPS. If it should be fi ,~e miles out,
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Sir CHARLEs RussiDLL. Certainly, undoubtedly. The most important light houses in the \Vorld are outside the 3 mile limit.
Lord HANNEN. The great Eddystone Light-house, 14 miles off
the land, is built on the bed of a rock.
Sir CHAR.LES RussELL. That point has never been doubted; and
if it were there is ample authority to support it. The right to
acquire by the construction of a light-bouse on a rock in midocean a territorial right in respect of the space so occupied is
undoubted; and therefore I answer my friend's case by saying
that ordinary territorial law would apply to it-there is no reason
why any different territorial law should apply.
Then n1y friend proceeds :
"Lord Chief Justice Cockburn answers this inquiry in the case
of Queen v. Keyn above cited (p. 198) when he declares that such
encroachments upon the high sea would form a part of the defence of a country, and 'come within the principle that a nation
may do what is necessary for the protection of its own territory.' "
The passage which I conceive my friend was referring to, is a
passage which, like _that from Azuni, requires, in order to understand it, the whole passage to be reacl. I am reading now from
page 58 of a printed report of the Judgment of Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn.
"It does not appear to n1e that the argument for the prosecution
is advanced by reference to encroachn1ents on the sea, in the way
of harbours, piers, break-waters, light houses, and the like, even
when projected into the open sea, or of forts erected in it, as is
the case in the Solent. Where the sea, or the bed on which it
rests, can be physically occupied permanently, it may be made
subject to occupation in the same n1anner as unoccupied territory.
In point of fact, such encroachments are generally made for the
benefit of the navigation; and are therefore readily, acquiesced
in. Or they are for the purposes of defence, and come· within the
principle that a nation n1ay do what is necessary for the protection of its own territory. Whether if an encroachment on the sea
were such as to obstruct the navigation, to the ships of other
nations, it would not amount to a just cause of complaint, as
inconsistent with international rights, might, if the case arose,
be deserving of serious consideration. That such encroachments
are occasionally made seems to me to fall very far short of establishing such an exclusive property in the littoral sea as that, in
the absence of legislation, it can be treated, to all intents and
purposes, as part of the realln."
In other words, it defends and justifies the taking possession
of a certain part of the sea, and perrnanently occupying it for
the purpose of erecting light-houses.
(13 Fur Seal Arbitration,

Proceedings, p. 337.)
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Discussion of 1893 attitude.-T'he statement of Sir
Charles Russell has been held by so1ne to support a claim
to the extension of mariti1ne jurisdiction by the erection
of a lighthouse or other structure in the high sea. Sir
Charles \vas probably not giving special attention to this
aspect of the question, but his remarks strictly construed,
and any staten1ent in regard to fundamental rights Inust
be strictly construed, ·would scarcely "\Varrant such construction. \Vhat Sir Charles said \Vas that,
it (the light-house) becomes, as far as that lighthouse is concerned, part of the territory of the nation which has erected it,
and, a s part of the territory of the nation which has erected it,
it has, incident to it, all the rights that belongs to the protection
of ter ritory-no 1nore and no less.

and later he says, in reply to a questionI answer n1y friend's case by saying that ordinary territorial
la\v would apply to it£-there is no reason why any different territorial law should apply.

This seems Inerely to affirm that the lighthouse itself
is under the territorial jurisdiction and not to imply an
extension of n1aritin1e juris¢liction.
Westlake's opinion.-Referring to this statement of Sir
Charles Russell in his discussion of territorial \Yaters,
Professor Westlake said :
The area of the land on which a strip of littoral sea is dependent
is Of no consequence in principle. Guns might be planted on a
small island, and we presume that even in practice an island,
without reference to its actual means of control over the neighbouring water, carries the soYereignty over the same width of the
latter all round it as a piece of mainland belonging to the s:une
state would carry. But an extrenw case may be put of something
which can scarcely be called an island. "If," Sir Charles Rus~ell
said when arguing in the Behring sea arbitration, "a lighthouse
is built upon a rock or upon piles driven into the bed of the sea,
it becomes as far as that lighthouse is concerned part of the
territory of the nation which has erected it, and, as part of the
territory of the nation which has erected it, it has incident to
it all the rights that belong to the protection of territory-no more
and no less." It is doubtful from the context whether the eminent
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advocate meant bY this to claim more for the lighthouse in its
territorial character than immunity from violation and injury, of
course together with the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of
its state. It \Vould be difficult to admit that a mere rock and
building, incapable of being so armed as really to control the
neighbouring sea, could be made the source of a presumed occupation of it converting a large tract into territorial water. It might
however be fair to claim an exclusive right of fishing so near the
spot that, without the light, fishing there would have been too
dangerous to be practicable. (International Law, part I, p. 186.)

Professor Westlake's doubt as to the exclusive right to
fishing n1ay be argun.ble, but if the lighthouse has been
constructed for the purpose of security to local fisheries,
elain1s 1night be n1ade accordingly, even though such a
contention of exclusive right does not seen1 to have been
made in case of lightships.
Later opinion.-,Vhile in the last edition of Oppenheiin's International La,v as revised by himself there
is no co1nment upon Sir Charles Russell's statement, there
is in the Roxburgh (third edition) edition of 1920 a
reference to this statement, which is son1e:\vhat abbreviated in the edition of 1928 prepared by Dr. MeN air, as
follo,vs:
Since the most important lighthouses ~J re built outsir1e the
n1aritilne belt of the littoral States, the question arises whether
a State can claim a maritime belt around its lighthouses in the
open sea-a question which Sir Charles Russell, the British
Attorney-General, in the Behring Sea Seal Fisheries case answered
in the affirmative. It is tempting to con1pare such lighthouses
with islands, and argue in favour of a 1naritime belt around
them; but I believe that such an identification is 1nisleading, and
that lighthouses n1ust be treated on the same lines as anchored
lightships. Just as a State 1nay not claim sovereignty over a
maritime belt around an anchored lightship, so it may not make
such a claim in the case of a lighthouse in the open sea. (1
International Law, 4th ed., p. 403.)

Dr. M. F. Lindley, writing in 1925 and also referring
to Sir Charles Russell's remarks, says:
Now, considering first the question of sovereignty over the surrounding water, although we agree with \Vestlake's conclusion on
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this point, it appears to us to rest upon other grounds. A control
sufficient to render the occupation effective could, apparently, be
exercised by placing an ar1ned vessel upon the part of the sea
in question, so that the fact that it 1nay be impossible to fortify
the lighthouse would not, by itself, be sufficient to render the
surrounding water inappropriable. The principle underlying this
case appears to be the san1e as that governing the one we have
just considered, and if a rock or barren island is not occupied
for its own sake, but 1nerely to facilitate fishing and navigation
in the surrounding ocean, it does not appear that this would be
a sufficient justification for extending the sovereignty of the
occupying State over those waters.
Secondly, in regard to the exclusive right of fishing, it is
difficult to see how the 1nere building of the lighthouse, which
is not sufficient to render the surrounding waters territorial,
takes this case out of the operation of the principle underlying
the decision in the Behring Sea Arbitration. Although the fishing
off the Seven Stones at the n1outh of the Bristol Channel would
be dangerous without the lightship which Trinity House maintains there, no exclusive right in the fishing is claimed for British
fishermen, and there appears to be no difference in principle between establishing a lightship upon a barren rock or upon piles
driven into the sea bottom. The case appears to be one to be
dealt with by Convention between the States interested, for which
precedents are not lacking. (Acquisition and Governn1ent of
Backward Territory in International Law, p. 67.)

B eaoons.-Beacons, buoys, and markers of various
types are novv con1mon in parts of the sea where there
are dangerous reefs and shoals, but it would not be
claimed that these extend the coastline of the state which
1nay place these aids to navigation. Indeed they are
not infrequently changed in location, usually with notice
to mariners without any contention that the jurisdiction
of the state making the change has relocated its territorial waters jurisdiction. Changing currents, shoals,
etc., may make necessary the marking of new channels,
Lut not the extension or n1odification o£ the jurisdiction
of the state ·undertaking the 1narking of the channel. It
r.aay be affirmed that the placing of beacons, buoys, etc.,
on submerged locations does not extend the marginal sea
jurisdiction but the jurisdiction over the marker itself

./

BEACONS

is in the state or states locating and caring :for its.
upkeep.
Case of United Slates v. Henning, 1925.-The question
as to 'vhether a beacon built upon a submerged reef
'vould be the point fron1 which the coastline should be
measured was raised in the case of the V nited States Y ..
Henning et al. in 1925. In the decision it was said:
The point where the Fra~nces E. was anchored was 12 miles.
west of Sea Horse Reef beacon on the west coast of Florida and
about 16 1niles west of the coast of Florida. This beacon is a
structure built on a shallow reef, and projecting up out of the
water, but the reef is wholly under water.
It is contended by the government that this beacon is under
the terms of section 3 of article 2 of this treaty ( 43. Stat. 176),
to be treated as the point from which the one hour's time is to
bE: estilnate<l. I cannot concede this construction. The language
is: "The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised
at a greater distance frmn the coast of the United States, its
territories or possessions, than can be traversed in one hour."
The be-acon certainly is a possession of the United States, but
these words properly mean and must be held to mean as if writtHl the distance " from the coast of the United States, the coast of
its territories, or the coast of its possessions ", for it was fro In
the coast the time was to~ be measured. The words undoubtedly
had reference to such territories or possessions as Porto Rico and
Hawaii. It certainly had no reference to marine structures
erected in the water and having no coast. (United States v.
Henning et al., (1925), 7 F. (2d) 488, 489

1
.)

While the decision in this case was reversed in 1926
(13 F. (2d) 74), probably the same position as to the
nature of jurisdiction as dependent upon the beacon
would be ·maintained.
Statu-s of air.-The Convention of 1919 relating to air
navigation 'vhich is generally accepted provides in its
first article that " the contracting states recognize that
every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty in the
air space above its territory and territorial waters ", and
this principle has been e1nbodied in other conventions.
There has been some debate as to whether the air over
the high seas is res nullius or res oomJJnunis. The air
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above the sea 'vould follo'v the nature of the sea. Practice and opinion see1ns to favor the res comn~unis doctrine under 'vhich the high sea 1nay be used for navigation, but 1nay not be exclusively appropriated. There
arises the question as to whether states having no, seacoast may have a right to use the sea. equally with states
having seacoast. A considerable degree of equality has
been admitted in the right of states having no seacoast to
issue docu1nents and certificates to vessels under. their
flags " in conformity with the general practice observed
in the principal 1naritime states." (Art. 273. Treaty
of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919; see also Barcelona
Declaration, April 20, 1921, 1924 Naval 'Var College,
Int. La 'v Docu1nents, p. 83; 7 League of Nations Treaty
Series, 1921, p. 74.) It is argued that if such states have
a right to fly their flags on vessels, then they must ha Ye
rights of coast states in the air above the high seas,
which see1ns difficult to deny.
Liability for wse.-While a part of the field of international la'v of aviation 'vas covered in the Convention
on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, October 13, 1919,
the field of private la'v did not receive corresponding
attention as regards foreign aircraft. In 1925 the French
Government took steps tovvard calling a conference for
considering the private internationalla'v of aviation and
the Cornite International Technique d'Experts Ju.ridiques
Ac?'iens came into existence in 1927. This Committee
has dra,vn up conventions for consideration by international conferences.
In the proposed conventions the fact that the subjacent area 'vith its population and property does not
voluntarily co1ne into relation to an aircraft is generally
recognized and the responsibility for damage is placed
upon the aircraft. This liability is affirrned in the latest
proposed conYention even though there 'Yas no intentional culpability on the part of the aircraft. Of course
da1nage due to a fault of the injured party is excepteft
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e.g., if a person is trespassing on a landing field. reserved
for aircraft.
It is evident that vvhile there 1nay be analogies betvveen
air and n1arine navigation, and air and land transportation, yet there are many aspects 'vhich are not analogous.
It is true that there may be analogies between craft.
lighter than w·ater and craft lighter than air, but the
analogies are limited in scope. Wheel vehicles responsive to the force of gravity are only in small measure
comparable to 'vinged or motor-driven vehicles coul}teracting some of the forces to 'vhich the 'vheeled vehicles
respond.
I nterna1tional significance.-The international significance of aerial navigation is evident in the growing net'vork of treaties and conventions particularly since 1919.
'1'he proposition of France to the Disarma1nent Conference in 1932 as to the internationalization of civil aviation e1nphasized another aspect and other possibilities
of aviation. 'Vhether the French proposition vvould
result as prophesied is doubted by son1e. Certainly tho
consequences are not as si1nple as son1e seem to believe.
Definitions.-In la,vs and conventions definitions have
been adopted but these are not yet entirely unifor1n. In
general, the ter1n " aircraft " includes any contrivance
capable of aerial flight and would cover flying machines,
balloons, gliders, etc., constructed for flight but not such
contrivances as parachutes and projectiles.
The ter1n " air space " is usually held to be the space
above any specified area and national air space is that
above the area over which a state exercises jurisdiction.
Detailed regulations as to rules of the road, signals,
markings, landing procedure, personnel, etc., are already
co1nn1on. International conventions on these matters are
now numerous and usually aim to facilitate communication. 'Vithin the United States it has been necessary that
1nany Federal regulations should be made as to aerial
navigation as a part of interstate con1merce, even to the
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n1odification of State regulations 'vhich n1ight hamper
interstate flying. The recognition of the principle which
has thus been applied in American interstate aviation
may similarly be essential in international aviation.
R ules for air navigation.-Thus far detailed rules for
air navigation have been largely national, though some
conventional agreements have been made both bilateral
and multilateral.
Some of the national legislation has been detailed in
specifications and regulations. Nearly all contain some
definitions of which the Chilean Decree of May 15, 1931,
is a type. This decree defines " aerodrome " as " any area
of land or water specially arranged for the accommodation, departure, or landing of aircraft." (Int. Commission for Air Navigation, Bul~etin of Information, no. 526,
art. 34, p. 7.)
Portuguese decree, Ootober 25, 1.{),30.-In 1930 Portugal
issued a decree promulgating detailed rules in regard to
aerial navigation. These rules which are full and classified defined aircraft. By " aerodrome " the rules (article
7) understand any land or 'vater surface set apart for the
taking off or arrival of aircraft. At an airport, as distinguished from an "aerodrome", there "\vould be also
additional facilities for revenue and other formalities as
in a 1naritime port.
Conventional regulation.-Early projects in regard to
regulation and control of aerial flight looked to uniform international regulation. No such hope has been
realized. More than 30 bilateral conventions have, however, e1nbodied differing rules, but as yet these are not so ·
unlike that they cannot be reconciled.
~1ost of the conventions recognize the sovereignty of
the state in the air above its jurisdiction, 'vhich includes
its territorial sea ~ At the same time there is an attempt
to maintain freedom of innocent passage though not all
aircraft are granted passage even in time of peace. In
general, equality of rights is conceded to all states. Reg~
1
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istra tion, etc., is to a large degree standardized. Frequent conferences are aiming at greater uniformity as
air lines spread over more extended areas.
Treaties upon aviation.-In recent years many treaties
relating to air navigation have been concluded. These
vary in their provisions but are usually reciprocal in
granting privilege of flight in tin1e of peace for private
aircraft of the parties.
An air-navigation arrangement between the United
States and the Netherlands, of which notes of agreement
were exchanged, November 16, 1932, contains the follo,ving:
ARTICLE

1

For the purpose of the present arrangement (a) the term
"territory" shall be understood to mean the United States of
America, the Netherlands and likewise possessions, territories, and
colonies oYer which they respectively exercise jurisdiction, including territory over sea and territorial waters; and (b) the
term "aircraft" shall be understood to embrace private aircraft
and commercial aircraft including state aircraft used exclusively
for commercial purposes.
ARTICLE

2

(1) Each of the Parties to this arrange1nent undertakes in time

of peace to grant liberty of innocent passage above its territory
to the aircraft of the other party, provided that the conditions set
forth in the present arrange1nent are observed.
(2) It is, however, agreed that the establishment and operation
of regular air routes by an air transport company of one of the
Parties within the territory of the other Party or across the said
territory, with or without intermediary landing, shall be subject
to the prior consent of the other Party given on condition of
reciprocity and at the request of the Party whose nationality
the air transport company possesses.
(3) Each Party to this arrangement agrees that its consent for
operations over its territory by air transport companies of the
other Party may not be refused on unreasonable or arbitrary
grounds. The consent can be made subject to special regulations
relating to aerial safety and public order.
( 4) Each of the Parties to this arrangement may reserve to its
own aircraft, air com1nerce between any two points neither of
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which is in a foreign country. Each Party may also reserve to
its own aircraft pleasure or touring flights starting from an
aerodrome in its territory and returning to the same aerodrome
for which a transportation charge would be 1nade. (Department
of State, Press Releases, Publication No. 409, Dec. 17, 1932,
p. 434.)

Regulation of air ser,vice.-vVith more than 100,000
1niles of air lines in regular operation, and as some of
these make easily accessible points formerly difficult of
access, states have been constrained to adapt their la,vs
1o these new conditions. This has been done in part
by do1nestic legislation and in part by international
agreement. For the ·carriage of foreign mail, interna6onal arrangements have become necessary. The results
of national surveys, meteorological data, and other information has been supplied by one state to others as
well as Inuch other data which might be of value in plann]ng air service. The use of the radio has added much
to the efficiency and safety of this service.
'fhe regulations thus far adopted and those proposed
sho'v conclusively that the rules for navigation at sea
do not and cannot apply to any great extent to aviation.
It is unfortunate for that reason that so Inany maritime
terms have crept into the language of aviation, for
analogies in fact are often re1note.
A ne'v set of problems may arise in regard to hydroplanes, if their range of flight is confined to the air above
the sea. Questions have been raised as to 'v hether these
are not in all respects to be treated as 1naritime vessels
as respects belligerent and as respects neutral rights.
Questions have also been raised as to 'vhether 'vhen on
the 'vater maritime law should apply and when in the
air aerial law should apply. Hydroplanes are, ho"~ever,
except for the place of con1ing to a stop, so nearly identical to aircraft 'vhich alights on land that there is no
reason entitling them to , different treabnent.
Report on air armam~ents, 193tE.-In deter1nining the
treatment of aircraft in the Disarmament Conference in
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1932, it was necessary to have a definite idea as to the aid
and service which the different types might render. In
a resolution of April 22, 1932, the Air Commission was
asked by the General Commission the :following
questions:
What are the air armaments:
(a) Whose character is the most specifically offensive ;
(b) 'Vhich are the most efficacious against national defence;
(c) 'Vhich are the most threatening to civilians?
Although it was made clear in the discussions in the Air Commission that the offensiveness of the air arma1nents, their efficacy
against national defence, and the threat that they represent to
civilians vary considerably on account of the wide differences in
the geographical position of different countries, the location of
their vital centres, and the state of their anti-aircraft defences,
and that any qualitativ~ question in connection with air armaments is closely bound up with quantitative considerations, the
Commission ·found it possible to set down certain general conclusions, which fonn Part I of this report. The Commission also
undertook a technical study of the efficacy and the use of air
armaments. The results of this study form Part II of the present
report. Part III contains several comments in regard to Parts
I and II, and Part IV contains statements by various delegations,
with an introduction.
PART

I.

These conclusions are as follows :
I. (a) All air armaments can be used to some extent for offensive purposes, without prejudice to the question of their
defensive uses.
If used in time of peace for a sudden and unprovoked attack,
air armaments assume a particularly offensive character. In
effect, before the State victim of the aggression can take the defensive measures den;:tanded by the situation, or before the League
of Nations or States not involved in the conflict could undertake
preventive or mediatory action, the aggressor State might in
certain eases be able rapidly to obtain military or psychological
results, such as would render difficult either the cessation of hostilities or the re-establish1nent of peace.
(b) Civil aircraft, to the extent that they Inight be incorporated into the armed force of a State, could in varying degrees
subserve miliary ends.
(c) Independently of the offensive character which air armaments nmy derive from their use, their capacity for offensive
action depends on certain of their constructional characteristics.
3628-34--6
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(d) The possibilities of offensive action of aeroplanes carried

by aircraft-carriers or war'ships equipped with landing-platforms
(or landing-decks) must be regarded as being increased by the
mobility of the vessels which carry th~m.
(e) The capacity for offensive .action of air armaments resulting from ·such constructional characteristics should first be considered from the point of view of the efficacy of such armaments
against national defence, and secondly from the point of view of
the threat offered thereby to the civilian population.
E!FFIOACY AGAINST NAT'IONAL DE!FENCEI

II. (a) The aircraft forming a part of the air armaments of a
country that may be regarded as most efficacious against national
defence are those which are capable of the most effective direct
action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare of
any kind.
(b) The effic~cy against national d~fence of an aircraft forming
part of such armaments, and considered individually, depends
upon its useful load and its capability of arriving at its objective.
(c) The efficacy against national defence of means of warfare
of every kind launched from the air depends upon the material
effect which they are capable of producing.
THREAT TO CIVIL POPULATION

III. (a) The aircraft forming part of the air armaments of a
country which can be regarded as the 1nost threatening to the
civil population are those which are capable of the most effective
direct action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare
of any kind; this efficacy depends primarily upon the nature of
the means of warfare employed and the manner in which they
are e1nployed.
(b) The degree of threat to the civil population represented
by an aircraft forming part of those armaments, and considered
individually, is in proportion to its useful load and its capability of arriving at its objective·.
(c) The 1neaus of warfare, intended to be dropped from the
air,. \vhich are the most threatening to the civil population are
those which, considered individually, produce the most extended
action, the greatest moral or material effect; that is to say, those
which are the n1ost capable of killing, \vounding and immobilising
the inhabitants of centres of civil population or of demoralising
then1. so far as concerns immediate consequences, and so far as
<·oncerns future consequences, of impairing the vitality of human

AIR ARMAMENTS

77

beings. Among these means the Commission specially mentions
poisonous gases, bacteria and incendiary and explosive appliances.
IV. The useful load of aircraft and their capability of arriving
at their objective are determined by a large number of variable
factors. 'Vhere useful load is concerned, the Air Commission
has noted among these variable factors, for purposes of examination, the unladen weight, the horsepower and the wing area for
aeroplanes, the volume and the horsepower for dirigibles.
(League of Nations Documents. Series IX, Disarmament, IX,
48. No. Conf. D. 123, p. 1.)

In part II the technical study showed that the " offensive character of air armaments can not be determined
arbitrarily", " depends upon the objectives ", etc.
Part III contained comments upon the conclusions embodied in part I.
The United States 'vith Portugal cast votes against
part I, conclusion I (d). There were 16 a~rmative
votes. 1'he delegation of the United States made the
follo,ving declaration:
The delegation of the United States considers that the statement in Paragraph I (d) as to the increased possibility of offensive action of ship-based aircraft is inappropriate for inclusion in
a report which deals with aircraft generally and which does not
otherwise discuss specific types of aircraft of the influence of the
base of action upon their offensive capabilities.
"One of the tests already contained in the report is that of
capability of arriving at an objective. Thus the mobility feature
of ship-based aircraft if already taken into account and any
further reference in the report which might give the impression
that individual ship-based aircraft are more specifically offensive
than individual aircraft taking off from bases close to land
frontiers is misleading."
The Portuguese delegation associated itself with this declaration, and the United I{ingdom delegation stated that it shared
the views therein expressed. (Ibid., p. 6.)

Part IV, which set forth national opinions, gave evidence of wide differences of view ranging from that of
states which had no air forces to that of states maintaining large air forces.
Terminology.-The terminology to designate a landing
place for aircraft on the high sea has been discussed from
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t1me to ti1ne and various terms have been proposed. 1'1H~
following have been among the many suggestions:
" flo a tin o· island " " marine airport" " airport in tltc
b
'
'
high sea", "marine aerodrome", etc., but the term "~ea~
ciro1ne ", 'vhile not ideal, has the advantage of being a
single 'vord of 'vhich the parts are associated 'vith the
location and 'vith the use.
Need of 1narine aerodrrornes.-There has been a gro,ving recognition that aerodromes 'vould be needed at sea
to a degree son1e,vhat comparable to the need ·on land
if transoceani"c aviation is to develop rapidly. The
transoceanic flights have in their early atte1npts gener-·
ally been of a spectacular character. For many reasons
such flights have involved great risk and expense. Nonstop flights are at present regarded as noneconon1ie
nndertakings. I£ transoceanic aviation is to becon1e
co1nmon it seems essential that seadro1nes be located.
!11-rjJortance of sead1?o1nes.-The proposals for locating
seadro1nes have been prin1arily based on arguments for
securing and increasing oYersea aviation. It has been
esti1nated that even a 1noderate nun1ber of seadro1nes in
the Atlantic Ocean 'vould increase trans-Atlantic aviation 100 percent. These seadromes, presumably equipped
for landing, taking off, refueling, or rep.airing, might
likewise be of great service to sub1narines and other
vessels.
The location of seadromes 'vould "be a matter of concern to all states if these are to be under national control
as the strategic conditions of mariti1ne states may be
greatly changed by such stations. It is entirely possible
that con1mercial routes would indicate one location while
strategic reasons would indicate another. Manifestly
also the high seas 1nay not be appropriated to the exclusive use of any state or corporation.
Types of proposals.-Manifestly high sea aerodro1nes~
if established, must be under responsible control. That
such aids to aviation shoul(l be subject to the vagaries
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of private control, operation, and competition, must be
considered undesirable. That it should be permitted to
any state to establish a seadro1ne off the coast of another
state for the purpose of carrying on hostilities against it
"\Vould seen1 unreasonable. These and other reasons have
led to propos:tions varying in nature. It has been proposed that seadron1es should be assimilated to islands
but the better opinion see1ns to be that seadromes are
not to be assi1nilated to islands. Son1e have ·wished the
con1plete control to be vested in the state of the constructor. Such a proposition has been denied as i1npracticable
by others. Representatives of non1naritime states have
claimed the same right to construct seadro1nes as states
ha v.:ng seacoast. rrhis has been denied by some on the
ground that an inland state would have no right of
access to the sea, except by convention or grace, of coast
states. It has been suggested that the League of Nations
be entrnstecl "\vith the ad1ninistra tion of the systen1 of
seadron1es but representatives of non1ne1nbers have raised
objections. In general, proposals have been met with
counter proposals and objections but progress has been
made in clarification of ideas.
1\.t the Disarn1ament Conference at Geneva, in 1932,
the proposals ranged from that of co1nplete abolition of
all 1nilitary aviation and internationalization of all civil
aviati0n to a gradual reduction of air forces ·with the
establishing of rules for their control and operation.
The proposal to transform air forces into an international police "\Yas favored by some states.
The international action of civil aviation received
1nuch attention at the Disar1na1nent Conference. The
Preparatory Con11nission of the League of Nations in
the Draft Convention had introduced the follo·winD'
artiC'les:
~

ART. 25. The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes,
capable of use in war, in cominission and in immediate reserve
in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Con-
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tracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for sueh
Party in the corresponding columns of Table I annexed to tlli~
Chapter.
The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable
of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the
land, sea and air fonnations organised on a n1ilitary basis of
each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures
laid down for such· Party in the corresponding colutnns of Table
II annexed to this Chapter.
AnT. 26. The nutuber, total horse-power and t9tal volume of
dirigibles, capable of use in war, in com1nission in the land, sea
and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties
shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the con·esponding columns of Table II annexed to this Chapter.
The nun1ber, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles
capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air
forn1ations organised on a military basis of each of the High
Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for
such Party in the corresponding columns of Table IV annexe<l
to this Chapter.
ART. 27. Horse-power shall be measured according to the following rules * * *
The volu1ne of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic 1netres.
ART 2.8.
1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain fron1 prescribing
the embodiment of 1nilitary features in the construction of civil
aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for
purely civil purposes, nwre particularly with a view to providing
the greatest possible measure of security and the n1ost economic
return. No preparations shall be made _in civil aircraft in time
of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose
of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.
2'. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil
aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for
military purposes. They undertal\:e to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to,
and the e1nployment of Inilitary aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Any such personnel or military n1aterial which
may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever nature shall
be included in the liinita tion applicable to the High Contracting
Party concerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26, of the
present Convention, as the case n1ay be.
3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise,
directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for n1ilitary
1
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Jmrposes instead of being established for economic, administrative
0r social purposes.
4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far
as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil
aviation undertakings in the different countries and to confer
together to this end. (League of Nations Publication IX. Disarmament, 1930. IX. 8. No. C. 687 lVI. 288., p. 14.)

Evident desiderata.-It is evident that high-sea aerodromes will be essential to convenient and safe transoceanic aviation. These should have a degree of unifor1n
character and administration. They should, when under
neutral flags, not increase the war risk of states. Highsea aerodromes should be open to all aircraft on equal
terms. The threat of or existence of hostilities should
not affect the service of the aerodromes. These should
not be fortified or adapted for 'var use. Exclusive control should not be in any one state though a degree of
national control 1nay be essential in order to secure the
necessary investlnent of public or of private capital. It
may be easier starting de novo to obtain satisfactory
agree1nents for the construction and Inaintenance of highsea aerodro1nes than would be possible if many such
structures were already in existence. The analogy is
closer to the status of a lightship than to that of an
island.
Seadro1nes not ships.-If a seadrome could be put in
the category of ships or vessels, the law applicable would
be fairly "rell defined. It is true there may be certain
analogies to a ship used as an aircraft carrier, but the
aircraft carrier is by its very nature constructed for the
purpose of navigation which is a common criterion in
distinguishing ships from. other structures. The prime
value of a seadrome would be permanence of location in
order that aircraft could plan their voyages with reference to its location. In the case of 0 ope v. Vallette
Dry Dock Oo1npany, 1887, which involved a. suit for
salvage of a dry dock, Mr. Justice Bradley, vvho ren-
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dered the decision 1n the Supreme Court of the United
States, said:
'Ve ha Ye no hesitation in saying that the decree of the Circuit
Court was right. A fixed structure, such as this drydock is, not
used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage
service, any more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water. The fact that it floats on the water
does not make it a ship or vessel, and no structure that is not
a ship or vessel is a subject of salvage. A ferry bridge is generally a floating structure,, hinged or chained to
wharf. This
n1ight be the subject of salvage as well as a drydock. A saEor's
floating bethel, or meeting house, moored to a wharf, and kept
in place by a paling of surrounding piles, is in the same ca tegory. It can hardly be contended that such a structure is
susceptible of salvage service (119 U.S. 625, 627.)

a

Sqme have suggested that seadro1nes be treated as ships
and be assimilitated to aircraft carriers.
In the case of Evansville Co. v. Chero Cola Co., 19126,
the court considered whether a ·wharf boat, not capable
of use as a means of transportation could be a vessel
and said,
The only question presented is whether appellant's wharfboat
was a "vessel" at the time it sank. It was an aid to river
traffic, but it 'vas not used to carry freight from one place to
atJother. It was not practically capable of being used as a means
of transportation. It served at Evansville as an office warehouse
and wharf, and was not taken from place to place. The connections with the water, electric light and telephone systems of
the city eYidence a pennanent location. It 11erformed no function that n1ig:ht not have been perforn1ed as well by an apptopriate structure on the land and by a floating stage or platform
pern1anently attached to the land. (271 U.S. 19', 22.)

From these and other cases, it is evident that a seadroine even \vhen located in the high sea \vould not :fall
into the category of ships \vhich \vould, if neutral, be
l~able to visit and search and to presentation before a
prize court.
·
Seadron~es in thne of ttoar.-The peace-tin1e status of
seaclron1es on the high sea see1ns. in the opinion of the
1najority of those \vho have giYen set!ous consideration
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to the Inatter, to be one in \Vhich the jurisdiction in the
thing itse:£ is in the state to "·hich the seadrome belongs,
or in the state \vhose subject established the seadro1ne.
Questions 1nay be raised as to the right o£ a state or o£
a citizen to establish a seadron1e on the high sea. It has
been proposed by son1e that this question be left to the
League o£ Nations, by others that it be settled by some
sort o£ an international conference or com1nittee, and by
others that there be no regulation. Plans £or neutralization ha Ye 1net " ·ith the criticism that neutralization gives
no guarantee in the tin1e o£ \Var in \vhich the neutralizing
po"·ers are engaged and by the :further criticisn1 that
neutralization n1ight provide only £or a time o£ \var
\Yhich might never occur.
Internationalization proposals have met with n1ore
support as visualizing the ti1ne o£ peace as \vell as o£ \var
and as based upon general rather than special considerations. The argtunent n1ay be put :forward that, the high
sea being ~res convnunis, any use o£ the high sea other
than that sanctioned by generally accepted practice
should be by international authorization and under international control. This 1nay be supported by the £act
that seadron1es n1ay be a risk to navigation, that seadron1es 1nay 1nocli£y the conditions o£ established coinInercial and other relations, that seadromes may be o£
capital i1nportance in deter1uining strategic plans.
The argu1nents £or internationalization o£ seadromes
seem most convincing, particularly as the :further use o:f
the high sea should be £or the general international good.
I£ the principle o£ internationalization be accepted, the
seadro1ne should not be open to any war use during
hostilities.
I£ internationalization is not adopted as a principle
and seaclro1nes are nationalized, neutral seadromes
should be closed to war use and the treatment o£ belligerent seadromes should be made kno,vn in advance by
proclamations in order that neutral aircraft may not
be subject to unkno\vn peril.

84

ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURES, MARITIME JURISDICTION

National control introduces many problems as to responsibility and liability in the use of seadromes. As
the seadromes are in the high sea, the states of the
world may claim an interest above· that in ordinary national property as the locating of the.. seadrome may be
regarded as tolerated by grace on account of its general
service, which service may not be .abandoned or made
impossible by national exigencies. vVhether a neutral
seadrome on the high sea may be visited and searched,
and then treated according to what the visit and search
seemed to disclose, is to restore a type of quarter-deck
court that has been usually viewed with disfavor by
courts and also by military officers concerned as being
foreign to their duties and profession. If neutral seadromes might be seized and occupied by belligerents on
the ground of assumed nonfulfillment of the laws of
neutrality, many abuses may arise which might involve
serious legal and other complications.
While there has been considerable attention given to
the status of landing stations for aircraft at sea in time
of peace, there has been compa~atively little attention
given to their status in time of war. So1ne European
conferences upon aviation laws have given incidental
consideration to certain aspects of this matter. In recent
years many have thrown aside the laws of war as being
negligible on the premise that there would be no more
'var, but, however desired this may be, a "\v.arless world
is not yet assured, and under these circumstances war,
if it co1nes, should be regulated to attain its ends with
the least possible loss of life and property. So long as
there is risk of war, it is evident that seadromes 1nay be
exceptionally exposed to its risks whether the seaclro1ne
be under a belligerent or under a neutral flag.
If the seadrome be under a belligerent flag in absence
of special regulations to the contrary, it "\Yould be liable
to treatinent as ene1ny property at sea. During the Spanish-An1erican 'Var lighthouses "\Yere not regarded as in-
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violable, and during the vVorld War, 1914-18, lighthouses
and lights 'vere under national control. Belligerents extinguished both their own and opponent's lights, though
not aiming attacks against opponent's lights as such.
Neutrals also gave notice of special regulations. Buoys
and buoy markings were also ·soinetJ rnes changed. It is
not to be expected that a state would maintain aids to
facilitate the 1novements against itself by its enemy
forces, and a neutr~l state 1nay wish to take measures
to a void violations of its neutrality.
The direct risk from the existence of seadromes might
be much greater than from lighthouses or lightships. If
a state can assume full and unr~gulated jurisdiction over
a seadrome which it or its subjects has constructed in
the high seas, then the seadrome may be treated as belligerent or neutral, according as the state is belligerent
or neutral. Indeed the construction and locating of seadroines n1ight under such national control become a matter of strategic planning for states and under the present
tendency to per1nit states 'vhich have no seacoast to locate airports on the high sea, 1night introduce novel problen1s of offense and defense.
Artificial exte1wions of land.-The extension of territory by construction of 'vharves, dykes, breakwaters, etc.,
along a river is per1nissible so long as it works no damage to other riparian states. If the boundary line is
already established by convention, it remains the same;
and if the boundary has been regarded as the thahveg,
it si1nilarly ren1ains unchanged.
Artificial extensions of land into the high sea without
causing da1nage to another state have been regarded as
legiti1nate use of the sea. So far as the sea. belongs to
no state, there is no party that can claim to be damaged.
Indeed, it 1nay be 1naintained that with few exceptions,
extensions of the land into the high sea are of ad vantage
to other states, because the purpose would ordinarily be
with view t.o greater convenience or safety in the use of
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the sea by all. Even extensions like sea 'valls for the
purpose o£ prevention o£ the washing a w·ay o£ land 'vould
be a relatively economic advantage, as thereby the land
'voulcl be preserved for possible use o£ 1nan. It 'voulcl
rarely be the case that the extension o£ land into the high
sea 'Yould be solely to the adYantage o£ the state priInarily concerned.
These extensions o£ land area at the san1e ti1ne extend
territorial and 1naritin1e jurisdictio~, but ·o£ course not
to an extent to i1npair the rights o£ other states. I£ a
hrealnYater or other land is extended out,vard £ro1n the
shore beyond the original 3-mile lin1it, the maritinte
jurisdiction is extended similarly. In general this gives
rise to no co1nplications ;' but i£ the break,vater were extended into a relatively narro··\V strait bet,veen t'vo states~
the state upon the opposite side 1night have ground for
objection.
Resu1ne.-vVhether seadro1nes 'vill be essential to the
further development o£ transoceanic flight, or Yfhether
the perfection o£ aircraft will make seadrori1es unnecessary, has been argued. It has usually been achnitted that
even i£ aircraft beco1ne much Inore fully perfected, there
n1ay be need for son1e seadron1es in the high seas for
special purposes.
Transoceanic flights will ordinarily be between states
o£ different nationality and some international regulations and understandings 'vill be needed. Such regulations and understandings are to a li1nited extent in existence and others are under consideration.
As the doctrine o£ the £reedo1n o£ the seas has after
centuries o£ struggle been generally recognized, there is
reluctance to concede to any state in absence. o£ specific
agree1nent any extension o£ the 1naritin1c jurisdiction.
National jurisdiction over lightships on the high seas and
lighthouses built in the high seas upon sub1nerged
foundations has been tacitly adn1itted in ti1ne o£ peace,
but later opinion li1nits jurisdiction to the lightship or
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fjghthouse itself, and maintains that the placing of
either in the high sea does not automatically extend the
jurisdiction of the state placing the lighthouse 3 1niles
out in all directions.
The filling in of the marginal sea out,vard fron1 the
coast has, ho,vever, been regarded as correspondingly extending the n1ariti1ne jurisdiction out,vard in the sea
proYicled this does not involve an impairing of the jurisdiction of any other state. While the filling in of an
area about a lighthouse built in the high sea 1nay be perInittcd so far as 1nay be reasonably convenient and needful for the 1naintenance of the light, the jurisdiction of
the state over the lighthouse is limited to this area. It
'vould seen1 to be essential also that this national jnris<liction extend for the safe custody of the light both
below· and above this area.
Opinion seen1s to support the view that if national
seadro1nes are per1nitted in the high seas, the national
j uriscliction shall be li1nited to the seadro1ne and the
space above and belo'v and not to adjacent 'vaters. Further, as the seadro1ne is permitted in the high sea as an
aid to navigation in the ti1ne of peace, its use in time of
'var shall be limited to that purpose. If it is under
neutral state jurisdiction, its function is restricted solely
to the purpose for which it was placed and neutral protection in adjacent "\Vaters does not extend even to vessels
'vhich for purposes other than the upkeep of the seadronle are· secured to the seadrome itself.
SOLUTION

(a) The visit and search of the neutral merchant vessel is la,vful, as there is no territorial sea around the
lighthouse built upon a submerged reef 14 miles :fron1
any coast. No protection, other than to assure the lawful
exercise of the visit and search, should be given to the
Nagle.
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(b) The visit and search of the neutral merchant vessel
is la,vful, as there is no territorial sea around the landing station for aircraft built upon a submerged reef 20
1niles from any land. No protection, other than to assure
the la,vful exercise of the visit and ~earch, should be
given by neutral vessels of war to the Nagle.
(c) The visit and search of the Nagle tied to an anchored landing station for aircraft of R is la,vful, as
there is no territorial sea around the landing station for
aircraft 20 miles from any land. No protection, other
than to assure the lawful exercise of the visit and search
should be given to the N a.gle.
(d) The visit and search of the neutral n1erchant vessel 'vithin 1 mile of a causeway built out from shore to
n landing station for aircraft is not lawful, as the merchant vessel is within territorial sea and the vessel of
war of R should afford protection against any violation
of the neutrality of state R, and should protect the merchant vessel against any violation of its rights within
these waters.
(e) All enemy aircraft are liable to capture if nonmilitary, or to attack if military, when not on or over the
landing station mentioned in (b) or ( o). Enemy aircraft may not be lawfully captured or attacked when
'vithin 3 miles of the causeway or landing station
rnentioned in ( d') but should be interned.

